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Detecting Abnormal Trading Activities in Option Markets:
Supplemental Appendix
Abstract
This supplemental appendix extends the empirical results in the main paper. Abnormal
trading activities on call and put options are analyzed for 19 companies in the banking and
insurance sectors from January 1996 to September 2009. Our empirical ndings suggest that
certain events such as the takeovers of AIG and Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac, the collapse of
Bear Stearns Corporation and public announcements of large losses/writedowns are preceded
by abnormal trading activities in call and put options. The realized gains amount to several
hundreds of millions of dollars. Several cases are discussed in detail.
Keywords: Options Trades, Open Interest, False Discovery Rate, Massive dataset, Financial
Crisis
JEL Classication: G12, G13, G14, G17, G34, C61, C65
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1 Introduction
As a result of the Subprime nancial and economic crisis, the United States Department of the
Treasury announced its voluntary Capital Purchase Program. The program was designed to en-
courage U.S. nancial institutions to increase their capital. The Treasury was willing to purchase
up to $250 billion in senior preferred shares in qualifying U.S. controlled banks and savings associa-
tions. Each nancial institution was able to obtain a maximum of $25 billion Tier 1 capital paying
an interest rate as high as 5% during the rst ve years and 9% thereafter. The nancial insti-
tution willing to participate in the program had to adopt the Treasury Department standards for
executive compensation and corporate governance for the period during which the Treasury holds
equity issued under the program. An unprecedented volume of the Capital Purchase Program and
huge losses/writedowns have seen over 2009{2011. Stocks of many companies have been subject to
astonishing ups and downs as well as huge amounts of equity value erased over a remarkably short
period of time. Informed traders or corporate insiders could have exploited private information
concerning default risk and bailout programs before its public release in order to take advantage of
those large stock movements.
In this appendix we analyze abnormal trading activities in put and call options from January
1996 to September 2009, covering the recent nancial crisis. Three dierent options markets are
considered: the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE), with companies American International
Group (AIG), Bank of America Corporation (BAC), Bear Stearns Corporation (BSC), Citigroup
(C), Fannie Mae (FNM), Freddie Mac (FRE), Goldman Sachs (GS), J.P. Morgan (JPM), Lehman
Brothers (LEH), Merrill Lynch (MER), Morgan Stanley (MS), Wachovia Bank (WB) and Wells
Fargo Company (WFC); Eurex (Zurich and Frankfurt), with UBS, Credit Suisse Group (CS) and
Deutsche Bank (DBK); and Euronext (Paris and London), with Societe Generale (GL), HSBC
(HSB) and BNP Paribas (BN). Many of the American companies belong to the list of banks
which were bailed out receiving approximately $200 billion through the Capital Purchase Program
in an eort to bolster capital and support new lending. The remaining companies have been
severely aected by the nancial crisis. Daily returns during the crisis are characterized not only
by unusually negative values, but large rises as well. Quarterly results, writedowns, bank run and
sold o of stocks easily lead to daily returns of more than 20%. Due to the large positive and
negative stock movements, we apply the procedure introduced in the main paper for detecting
abnormal trading activities in put and call options.
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As discussed in the introduction of the main paper, informed traders and/or corporate insiders
hedging their human capital are most probably behind abnormal trades in put options. Without
knowing trader identities, it is not possible to disentangle whether put option abnormal trades
are due to informed traders or corporate insiders hedging their human capital. We describe this
situation as saying that we are testing a joint hypothesis.
2 Data
For completeness, we describe our dataset in this appendix as well. We analyze several American
and European companies from the banking and insurance sectors. For American companies, op-
tions data are from the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) as provided by OptionMetrics.
Stock prices are downloaded from OptionMetrics as well to avoid non-synchronicity issues, and
are adjusted for stock splits and spin-os using information from the CRSP database. Intraday
transaction prices and volumes for each underlying stock price are from the NYSE's Trade and
Quote (TAQ) database. This database consists of several millions of records for each stock and is
used in the classication of volumes in buyer and seller-initiated trades in order to complete the
analysis related to the hedging criterion. For European companies, options data as well as intraday
transaction prices and volumes for the underlying stock are obtained from EUREX provided by
Deutsche Bank, and from EURONEXT provided by NYSE Euronext. All datasets include the
daily cross section of available put and call options for each company and intraday data for the
underlying assets from January 1996 to September 2009. We eliminate obvious data errors such as
open interest reported at zero for all existing options by excluding those days from our analysis.
The list of American and European companies analyzed is given in the Introduction. All options
are American style.
3 Empirical Results
We apply the procedure in introduced in the main paper to the above-mentioned American and
European companies. We use the same notation as in the main paper. We report most of the results
in tabular form. Tables 1{13 present an overview of the put and call abnormal trades belonging
to the intersection of 
1 \ 
2 \ 
3 \ 
4 for the 13 American companies analyzed, Tables 14{16
for the European companies with options listed on EUREX, and Tables 17{19 for the European
companies with options listed on EURONEXT. These tables report only the selected transactions
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during 2007{2009. The total number of detected options for the whole sample period 1996{2009 is
given in brackets after the option specication (put or call).
In the following subsections, we separately analyze our empirical ndings for the three markets;
CBOE, EUREX, and EURONEXT. We discuss some specic cases. Additional tables and gures
are available from the authors upon request. Although our sample period covers almost 14 trad-
ing years, the percentage of transactions that fall into the Subprime nancial crisis (2007{2009) is
remarkably high. There may be several reasons for this: rst, the high volatility during the crisis
induced large and sudden movements in stock prices generating gain opportunities for informed
market participants; second, due to the dramatic and rapid collapse of the nancial system, the
number of corporate and governmental decisions made has sharply increased, giving rise to nu-
merous potential information leakages and abnormal trading activities; third, trades made before
scheduled announcements could be based on speculative bets, the latter being facilitated by several
rumors already present in the market. With respect to realized gains, the numbers are generally
higher than the ones detected during 1996{2006 and reported in the main paper. By virtue of
leverage, large drops/rises in the underlying stock lead relatively quickly to net prots of more
than 1 million through option trading. With respect to the option type, we nd that the number
of detected put trades is usually larger than the number of detected call trades.
3.1 Trading Activities on the CBOE
3.1.1 J.P. Morgan's Takeover of Bear Stearns Corporation in March 2008
The nancial crisis began spreading more widely in August 2007 with the collapse of two Bear
Stearns hedge funds which had heavily invested in Subprime-related securities. On December 20th,
2007 Bear Stearns posted fourth quarter losses of $854 million after mortgage related writedowns
of $1.9 billion. It was the rst quarterly loss in its 85-year history.
In Spring 2008, Bear Stearns was the subject of a multitude of market rumors regarding its
liquidity. Early in the week of March 10th, 2008 rumors swirled around Wall Street that European
rms had suspended xed income trading with Bear Stearns. U.S. traders began to stop trading
with Bear, hedge funds pulled money from prime brokerage accounts, money market funds reduced
their investment in short-term Bear issued debt. The company then suered a cash crunch.
On Thursday, March 13th, Bear shares fell more than 7% to $57. Bear called J.P. Morgan, its
clearing bank, to warn that it might not have enough cash to meet its obligations on Friday and
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needed emergency help. It also called the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York. In an evening conference call among the New York Fed, the Securities
and Exchange Commission, the Fed Board of Governors and the U.S. Treasury, the SEC said Bear
Stearns might le for bankruptcy the next morning.
On Friday, March 14th, the New York Fed, the Fed Board of Governors and the Treasury held
a conference call to discuss the options. They decided to issue an overnight non-recourse loan to
J.P. Morgan so that the bank could then loan money to Bear Stearns. The loan was intended to get
Bear Stearns through to the weekend while the companies and government ocials explored Bear
Stearns' options and ways to contain potential damage. Bear shares fell 46% to $30.85. Credit
rating agencies downgraded Bear Stearns debt and customers continued to pull funds to the point
where Bear Stearns ocials feared the bank would be insolvent by the time Asian markets opened
on Sunday evening.
On Sunday evening, March 16th, J.P. Morgan announced that it would acquire Bear for about
$2 a share and that the Fed would provide J.P. Morgan with a $30 billion loan backed by Bear assets.
J.P. Morgan guaranteed billions of dollars in Bear trading obligations. The deal was announced
just before Asian markets opened. On Monday, March 17th, Bear shares started the day with a
drop of nearly 90% to $2.86.
For the period 1999{2009, our procedure detected 16 transactions in put options and 11 in calls.
9 trades in puts and 2 in calls fall into the time period 2007{2009. We now focus on a series of
trades in put options which took place in the days leading up to the collapse of Bear Stearns. We
detected 6 large trades in put options from March 4th till March 14th, most of them involving
deep out-of-the money options. Since the dynamics of such trades are similar, we do not report all
details for every transaction, but concentrate on a few examples.
On March 10th, Bear Stearns stock traded at $62.30. On that day, 11,757 contracts of put
options with strike $30 and maturity end of March were created at CBOE. Due to the deep out-
the-money moneyness, these options were traded at the cheap price of $0.625. Such an increment
of open interest corresponds to the 99.70% quantile of its historical distribution. The same options
exhibited another unusually high increment the following day when its open interest increased by
an additional 22,809 contracts. The price of the option even decreased to $0.25 as the stock price
increased slightly.
On March 17th, when the market reopened after the intense negotiations marathon between
Bear Stearns, J.P. Morgan and the Fed, the stock dropped nearly 85% to $2.86, increasing the
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value of these put option to $27.14. The day of the announcement corresponds to the exercise of
8,150 option contracts. On March 18th, an additional 9,310 put options were exercised, leading to
net gains of more than $50 million.
On March 12th, the put option with strike $40 and maturity April, exhibited a large increment
in open interest: on that day, the stock traded at $61.58, making the option deep out-of-the money
and tradable at $1.86. On the day of the announcement, its value increased to $37.14, resulting in
a net prot of more than 1,700% in three trading days. The sequential exercise of these options
over the following weeks generated net gains of more than $6 million. Additional details can be
found in the separate appendix.
3.1.2 The Case of American International Group
We start with a concise summary of key events involving AIG, and discuss thereafter our empirical
ndings. In October 2007, when the stock was at $68.59, AIG entered a turbulent period. The
company reported that its swaps portfolio lost $352 million. A month later, that gure was revised
to $1.1 billion. Between early October and mid-November 2007, AIG's stock price fell 25%. In
February 2008, AIG announced estimated losses of $11.5 billion, and that it had posted $5.3 billion
in collateral, pushing down the stock to under $50. In summer 2008, it was reported that the
Justice Department was investigating AIG for possible criminal fraud. The UK's Serious Fraud
Oce would later announce its own probe. At the beginning of September 2008, when the stock was
at $21.96, AIG executives learned that the ratings agencies planned to downgrade the company's
rating again. That would trigger more collateral calls, which AIG knew it could not begin to cover.
Desperate negotiations to keep the company aoat|including a possible $75 billion bridge loan
from Goldman Sachs and J.P. Morgan, both major counterparties on the credit default swaps|
ensued. Tim Geithner, Head of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, was called in. It became
clear that AIG's level of exposure to its credit default swap losses was higher than anyone had yet
understood. On September 16th, 2008 the Federal Reserve Board announced that it would take a
nearly 80% equity stake in AIG|eectively taking over the rm|and provide an $85 billion loan.
On that day, AIG stock was at $3.75.
Applying our detection procedure, we selected a total of 17 transactions in put options and 17
in call options for the whole sample period, with 7 and 2, respectively, falling into the nancial
crisis, January 2007{September 2009. We now discuss some cases in detail. Information regarding
the remaining transactions can be found in the reported tables.
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The rst transaction in put options took place on October 5th, 2007. The underlying stock
was at $69.39. The average return of the underlying stock during the last two trading weeks, Mt,
was slightly positive, 0.18%. The requested put options are at-the-money with a value of $1.9 and
a maturity of November 2007. The increment in open interest is 7,594 contracts, corresponding
to 95.7% of its historical distribution. This transaction precedes the rst AIG reported losses
concerning its business activities in CDS. In the following weeks, the underlying stock fell sharply,
increasing the option's value to levels above $7. Many of these options were sequentially exercised
which led to net gains of approximately $7 million. An interesting sequence of transactions took
place in the days leading up to the takeover of AIG on September 16th, 2008. On September 10th,
11th and 12th, large increments in put options were observed on the CBOE. The maturities of
these options were October and November 2008. The market was bearish during the preceding
trading weeks and a large demand for protective put options seemed to be a plausible consequence.
On September 10th the stock traded at $17.50 and 23,137 new put options with strike $18 were
requested. These options were at-the-money with a price of $3.40. The following day, the stock
traded at $17.55 and 14,494 new put options with strike $8 were bought on the CBOE. These
options were deep out-of-the-money and therefore quite cheap ($0.69). Furthermore, on September
12th, 14,249 new out-of-the-money put options with strike $10 were bought on the CBOE. Their
price was $1.465. The rst two options matured in November 2008, whereas the latter matured
at the end of September. Three trading days later, on September 16th and just one day after the
collapse of Lehman Brothers, the Federal Reserve announced that it would take over AIG. The
stock price dropped to $3.75, pushing those put options deep in-the-money and increasing their
value to more than $14 in the rst case, $5 in the second and third case. On the same day, 12,931
options of the rst type, 13,924 of the second and 1,974 of the third were exercised, leading to a net
prot of more than $13 million, $6 million and $1 million, respectively. On September 17th and
18th, when the underlying stock decreased further in value to $2, a large number of these options
were exercised, leading to large prots. The total realized gains through exercise, Gt, amounted to
$24, $4.5 and $7.9 million, respectively. Figures 1 and 2 report the dynamics of these transactions.
We now discuss a detected transaction in call options which took place on July 30th, 2009. The
stock traded at $13.13 with bearish market condition, with Mt being at  2.21%. 2,806 out-of-the-
money (strike $15) call options were requested on July 30th with a price of $0.95. A few days later,
on August 7th, a prot quarterly announcement increased the stock value to $27.14, raising the
value of the call options to $12.38. This represents a net prot of more than 1,200% in less than
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two trading weeks. On August 28th the stock reached the level of $50.23, increasing the option's
value to $35. Between July 30th and maturity, i.e., September 2009, exercising the call options led
to net gains of more than $5.5 million. The remaining out-of-the-money call option detected on
August 18th, shows similar behavior and the total net gains amounted to $5.3 million. Additional
information can be found in Table 1 and Figure 3.
3.1.3 The Case of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
For the case of Fannie Mae, our procedure detected 17 transactions in put options, 10 of which
took place in the years 2007{2009, and 13 in call options, 4 of which during the nancial crisis. In
the case of Freddie Mac, these include 12 for puts and 15 for calls, respectively. 5 trades in puts
and 6 in calls occur after 2007.
On July 13th, 2008, after a weekend of negotiations, the Treasury and the Federal Reserve
announced emergency measures to backstop Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The two companies
would get access to credit lines, including direct access to Fed money if necessary, and a provision
for the Treasury to take an equity stake in the companies if required. The Securities and Exchange
Commission announced measures aimed at stemming the spread of false rumors. Two days later,
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac shareholders still found no overt assurance regarding the fate of
common stock in any government bailout. Freddie Mac shares plunged 26% and Fannie Mae
plummeted 27%. In the following days, Freddie Mac completed its second successful debt sale of
the week, and condence regarding the fate of the rescue eort moving through Congress rose.
Fannie Mae shares rose more than 18% and Freddie Mac added nearly 22%. On July 23rd, the
House of Representatives approved a housing market support package including a mandate for
the U.S. Treasury to provide equity or debt to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The White House
dropped opposition to other measures in the broad housing bill and pledged to sign it into law.
Fannie Mae shares rose almost 12% to $15, their highest close since July 9th. Freddie closed up
more than 11% at $10.80, its highest close since July 8th. On August 8th, Fannie Mae posted a
second quarter loss of $2.3 billion before preferred dividend payments, or $2.54 a share. It was the
fourth straight quarterly loss, bringing its cumulative loss over 12 months to $9.44 billion before
preferred dividends. Fannie cut its dividend and said it would raise loss reserves. Based on an
article published on August 17th in Barron's magazine, the Treasury Department was increasingly
likely to recapitalize Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the coming months using taxpayer's money.
The following day, share prices for mortgage nance companies dropped, with Fannie Mae's price
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plunging 22% to a 16-year low of $6.15 and Freddie Mac's down 25% to $4.39. The New York Times
and Washington Post reported late on Friday, September 5th, that in what could be the largest
nancial bailout in the nation's history, the U.S. government planned to put government sponsored
mortgage nance companies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac under federal control. The closing share
price on that Friday was $7.04 for Fannie Mae and $5.1 for Freddie Mac. On Sunday, September 7th,
2008 the Federal Government announced its takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, eectively
nationalizing them. At that point Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac owned or guaranteed about half of
the U.S.'s $12 trillion mortgage market. This led to panic as almost every home mortgage lender
and Wall Street bank relied on them to facilitate the mortgage market; investors worldwide owned
$5.2 trillion of debt securities backed by them. On Monday, September 8th, when the market
reopened, the stock price of Fannie Mae crashed by almost 90% to under $1, and Freddie Mac
stock fell to $0.88, decreasing its value by more than 80%.
Our procedure detected a series of abnormal trades in put options starting on August 11th,
the month leading up to the takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 6 large increments in put
options were found for the underlying Fannie Mae and one for Freddie Mac. In all cases, the
acquired put options were deep out-of-the-money, making them available at a cheap price. On
September 7th, when both underlying stocks lost more than 80% of their value, these options went
deep in-the-money and, through a sequential exercise in the following days, several millions in net
gains were collected. We now discuss a few of these transactions in detail. Additional information
for the remaining ones can be found in Tables 5 and 6 and Figures 4 and 5.
For Fannie Mae, on August 11th, 2008 the put option with strike $6 and maturity September
saw an impressive increment in open interest of 10,164 contracts. The underlying stock traded
at $8.40, the market condition Mt was slightly negative ( 0.21%) and the put price was $0.675.
Before this strong increment, the level of open interest was almost zero. In the following weeks,
the open interest of these options continuously increased, reaching a maximum number of 31,824
contracts on September 4th, where another strong increment of 5,774 contracts was detected by
our procedure as an abnormal trade. On that day, the price of the underlying stock was $6.42 and
the price of the put option $0.75. On Monday, September 8th, the day after the announcement
that the Fed would take over Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the value of the put options increased
by more than 600%, reaching a value of $5.3 per option contract. On the same day, 7,162 contracts
were exercised, leading to net gains of more than $3 million. Furthermore, another large number
of options (11,730 contracts) were exercised a few days later. The net gains from this exercised
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amount were more than $5 million. Another put option abnormal trade with underlying stock
Fannie Mae was detected on August 28th; see Figure 4. The increment in open interest totaled
15,178 contracts, the strike price was $7 and the option had a time-to-maturity of 114 days. The
underlying stock traded at $7.95 and the put option had a value of $2.6. Until September 9th, the
level of open interest remained constant. The day after, 14,701 contracts were exercised when the
option's price was $6.2. The net gains amounted to more than $5 million. In the case of Freddie
Mac, our methodology detected only one transaction in put options on September 3rd, 2008. Its
strike was $3 with a time-to-maturity of 136 days. The underlying asset traded at $5.38 and the
put had a value of $0.9. The strong increment in open interest observed on September 3rd (2,260
contracts) was oset by the exercise of 2,430 options on September 10th, when the option had a
value of $2.35. The net gains from this transaction amounted to approximately $300,000. With
respect to the detected transaction in call options, both companies were subject to large trade in
calls in March 2008. Our procedure detected 3 abnormal trades for Fannie Mae on March 5th, 7th
and 11th, and three for Freddie Mac on March 10th, 11th and 18th. All these options were almost
at-the-money and matured at the end of March. The market condition variable was between  1%
and  2%, indicating that these call options had been bought during a bearish period. We do not
provide the details of these transactions but are available upon request. The dynamics behind
these trades are the same as those described in the previous examples: the observed increments
in open interest are all above their 94% historical quantiles and occurred during the days leading
up to March 20th, 2008 when U.S. regulators eased capital requirements for the two rms in order
to provide up to $200 billion in immediate liquidity for stressed mortgage markets. On that day,
shares of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac jumped by approximately 26%. In both cases, a considerable
number of call options were exercised in the subsequent days leading to net gains of several millions.
Additional details can be found in Tables 5 and 6.
3.1.4 Additional Comments on the CBOE Options Trades
For the remaining companies with options traded on the CBOE, we do not report detailed results
but refer to the corresponding tables. We collect a list of option abnormal trades. The dynamics
of these trades are the same as in the previous extensively discussed examples.
For Bank of America, on November 14th, 2008 and January 14th, 2009 two abnormal trades
in put options were detected. Both trades were followed by a stock crash of more than 20% due
to the announcements of 35,000 and 1,000 job cuts, respectively. The resulting gains through
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exercise amounted to $5.4 million and $3.3 million, respectively. Quarterly prots announced on
July 22nd, 2008 (with a stock value increase of 22.4%), were preceded by a series of transactions
in call options resulting in total net gains of more than $8 million. For Citigroup, our method
detected a transaction on Friday, November 21st, 2008 in a deep out-of-the-money call option
with short time-to-maturity. The increment in open interest amounted to 61,927 option contracts,
i.e. the 99.7% quantile of its historical distribution. On the following Monday, the government's
plan to help Citigroup by buying $20 billion of preferred stock was announced. The stock value
increased in the following days by more than 50% and a large number of call options were exercised,
leading to net gains of more than $7 million. The amount of nancial losses reported on January
16th, 2009 induced a drop in the underlying stock of more than 23%, and were preceded by 3
transactions in out-of-the-money put options traded on the CBOE on January 7th, 8th and 12th.
The total realized gains after the stock crashed amounted to more than $9 million. The prot drop
of 76% announced by J.P. Morgan on January 15th, 2009 was preceded by three large trades in put
options on December 31st, January 2nd and 6th. Realized gains totaled more than $17 million.
The strong rise in stock value between March 9th and March 18th (from $15.9 to $27.11) was
preceded by unusually high increments in out-of-the-money call options between March 5th and
9th. Realized gains from options exercise totaled more than $16 million. For Morgan Stanley, we
found 2 large transactions in deep out-of-the-money call options on October 9th and 10th, 2008.
These precede the announcement on Monday, October 13 that a Japanese bank intended to buy
1/5 of Morgan Stanley. The stock value nearly doubled that day, resulting in net gains of more than
$12 million through the exercise of those call options. A series of abnormal trades in put options
with underlying stock in Wachovia Bank was detected during the month of September 2008, the
period leading up to the announcement on September 29th that the bank would be taken over due
to its uncertain situation. On that day, the stock plummeted by more than 81%, pushing these put
options deep in-the-money. The subsequent exercise of these options led to realized gains of more
than $23 million. For Wells Fargo, the underlying stock had been sharply loosing value during
the rst two months of 2009: the stock was traded around $30 in January 2009, and on February
27th, it was worth $12.1. We detected abnormal trades on January 6th, 7th, 8th and 28th. The
subsequent exercise of these put options led to substantial gains.
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3.2 Trading Activities on EUREX|Frankfurt and Zurich
Option contracts with underlying German and Swiss companies are traded on EUREX, one of
the world's largest derivatives exchanges and the leading clearing house in Europe established in
1998 after the merger between Deutsche Terminborse (DTB, the German derivatives exchange)
and SOFFEX (Swiss Options and Financial Futures). In this section we use the EUREX database
provided by Deutsche Bank to analyze option transactions with underlying UBS, Credit Suisse
Group (CS) and Deutsche Bank (DBK). Our empirical ndings are summarized in Tables 14, 15
and 16. In the case of UBS, our procedure detected 16 transactions in put options, 13 of which fell
into the period 2007{2009. The proportion of call options is smaller, with 3 out of 13 transactions
taking place during the nancial crisis. For CS, we detected 16 trades in puts and 13 trades in calls
for the entire sample period. The proportion falling into the period after 2007 is around one third.
For DBK, we identied a total of 16 transactions in put and 3 in call options. More than half of
these put trades took place in the last two years of our sample, whereas only one call abnormal
trade was found for the years 2007{2009.
We now discuss a specic event related to Credit Suisse. On October 13th, 2008 Israeli holding
company Koor Industries (KOR.TA) invested CHF 1.2 billion in Credit Suisse in exchange for a
3% stake in the bank. On that day, CS jumped by more than 27%. Furthermore, on October 16th,
2008 Credit Suisse raised approximately CHF 10 billion, about 12% of its outstanding equity, from
private investors. The Qatar Investment Company increased its stake in Credit Suisse to 8.9%,
while Saudi conglomerate Olayan increased its stake to 3.6%. Our procedure detected an abnormal
trade on September 18th in deep out-of-the-money call options with maturity December 2008. The
increment in open interest amounted to 10,010 contracts, being at the 93% quantile of its historical
distribution. Due to the remarkable rise in stock value observed a few weeks later, these options
went in-the-money and saw gains through exercise of approximately CHF 1.5 million.
3.3 Trading Activities on EURONEXT|London and Paris
Options with underlying French and British companies are traded on EURONEXT in Paris and
London. In this subsection we report our empirical ndings for Societe Generale (GL), BNP Paribas
(BN) and HSBC (HSB). We discuss some specic cases. Information regarding the remaining
transactions can be found in Tables 17{19.
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3.3.1 The Case of Societe Generale
On January 24th, 2008 the bank announced that a single futures trader at Societe Generale had
fraudulently lost the bank €4.9 billion, the largest such loss in history. Jerome Kerviel, a relatively
junior futures trader, allegedly orchestrated a series of bogus transactions that spiraled out of
control amid turbulent markets in 2007 and early 2008. Executives said the trader acted alone
and that he may not have beneted directly from the fraudulent deals. The bank announced it
would be immediately seeking €5.5 billion Euros in nancing. On Tuesday, January 22nd, 2008 the
French stock market regulator said that it had begun a formal investigation into Societe Generale.
It was not clear whether the inquiry was related to the revelation that Robert Day, a member of
Societe Generale's Board, had sold shares in the bank worth €45 million on January 18th, the day
Societe Generale explained that management had rst been alerted to Mr. Kerviel's unauthorized
trading, and two days before the bank's audit committee was informed of a planned €2.05 billion
writedown linked to the bank's exposure to the U.S. Subprime lending market. Societe Generale
and a spokesman for Mr. Day said in separate statements that the share sales by Mr. Day and his
family's trusts occurred in several transactions from December 2007 to January 18th, 2008 during
a predetermined window when directors were allowed to exercise options. Both statements said all
required disclosures had been made, and \no inside information was used in any way" with respect
to these sales. Our detection procedure detected two abnormal trades in put options on January
9th and 16th, 2008. Both options were out-of-the-money with short maturity. Their exercise led to
gains of more than €1.7 million. In addition, the February 12th, 2008 announcement that Societe
Generale planned to raise $8 billion in capital was preceded by two abnormal trades in deep-out-of
the money call options. After the substantial stock rise, the exercise of these options led to a total
gain of more than €9 million. Other abnormal trades in put as well as call options can be found
in Table 17.
3.3.2 Additional Comments on EURONEXT Options Trades
For BNP Paribas and HSBC we do not report detailed results but refer to the corresponding tables
for additional information (Tables 18 and 19). For BNP Paribas, we detected a series of abnormal
trades which took place between January 14th and 18th, 2008. The involved put options were deep
out-of-the-money with short maturity. On January 30th, the announcement that quarterly prot
would slump over 40% had a strong impact on the underlying asset. The exercise of these put
14
options led to a net prot of more than €2 million.
3.4 Controlling False Discoveries in Option Abnormal Trades
We apply the procedure described in the main paper to control for false discoveries in abnormal
trades. We briey discuss the results Lehman Brothers. For the remaining companies, similar
results have been found. Details are available upon request from the authors. The total number
of analyzed options trades amounts at 218,000, implying that the regression coecients m for the
subintervals Im have been computed by relaying on 218 returns r
k
t . The estimated proportion of
truly abnormal trades is E[T+] = 6:9% (with standard error 0.9%, optimal  = 0:6, and  = 0:05),
corresponding to 69 abnormal trades. As our method detected 7 option abnormal trades, it appears
to be conservative. Figure 7 shows estimated m, t-statistics, and p-values for computing the false
discovery rate for Lehman Brothers.
4 Additional Cases
Tables 24 and 25 describe put option abnormal trades for the various sectors analyzed in the main
paper.
4.1 Delayed Delivery Announcement of EADS Superjumbo A380 in May 2006
At the time of the writing of this paper, European Aeronautic Defence and Space (EADS), a
large European aerospace corporation and the parent of plane maker Airbus, is under investigation
for illegal insider trading activities. On July 2nd, 2006, co-CEO Noel Forgeard and Airbus CEO
Gustav Humbert resigned following the controversy caused by the June 14th, 2006 announcement
that deliveries of the superjumbo jet A380 would be delayed by a further 6 months. Mr. Forgeard
was one of a number of executives who sold his stake in EADS a few months before the public
announcement. In June shares of EADS exhibited a 26% fall (the closing price of EADS shares on
June 13th was €25.42 and on June 14th €18.73) wiping more than €5 billion from the company's
market value. He and 21 other executives are currently under investigation as to whether they
knew about the delays in the Airbus A380 project and sold their stock on the basis of this private
information, constituting therefore illegal insider trading. In the nancial press, the prots resulting
from this strategy are estimated to total approximately €20 million.1
1The New York Times edition of June 18th, 2008: \Executive Questioned in EADS Insider Trading Case".
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For the period 2003{2009 our procedure detects 4 put option contracts on EUREX related to
abnormal trades, all of which took place between April 6th and May 22nd, 2006.2 These options
contracts had the following maturities May, June, July, and December 2006. For example, the
options maturing in July 2006 exhibited large increments in open interest on May 16th (1,135
contracts), on May 19th (4,061 contracts), and on May 22nd (1,250 contracts). These increments
correspond to very high quantiles of their respective two-year empirical distributions. For example,
the main increase in open interest (May 19th) corresponds to 99.8% quantile. The 4 options
contracts had strikes of €31, €31, €26 and €30 and the underlying traded at €32.4, €27.5, €27.5
and €32.1 respectively on the transaction days. The average returns generated from these trades
are large. For example, the selected option contract with maturity June was bought mainly three
times April 5h, April 6h, and May 18th at the following prices €0.96, €1.17 and €3.46 when the
stock price was respectively at €32.77, €32.37 and €27.50. These contracts were mainly exercised
on June 16th at option prices €11.10 and stock price of €19.80. The total gain corresponds to
€2.2 million and the average return is 370% within two months. Similar patterns are observed for
the other 3 options contracts. Based on all 4 detected options, a total gain of €8.7 million had
been realized within 60 trading days after the announcement.
Options contracts with underlying EADS are traded at the EURONEXT in Paris as well.
Using a database provided by EURONEXT NYSE, our second method detects 3 options contracts
related to abnormal trades which took place between April and May 2006. The total gains of these
transactions amount to approximately €18.7 million. Details are available upon request.
4.2 Quarterly Loss of UBS in October 2007
Our detection procedure identied 3 trades in put options which took place in October 2007,
maturing in October, December and June 2008. 2 of the 3 acquired options were out-of-the money.
These trades preceded the October 30th announcement that UBS, Europe's largest bank by assets,
reported its rst quarterly loss in almost ve years. Declines in the U.S. Subprime mortgage
market led to $4.4 billion in losses and writedowns on xed-income securities. Third quarter net
loss was CHF 830 million ($712 million). In the following weeks, UBS stock started an impressive
decline, and through the exercise of these puts options net gains of more than CHF 24 million were
2On May 12th, 2006, a meeting of the company board took place in Amsterdam in order to discuss possible
solutions to the management crisis triggered by the future announcement which was planned for the following month.
According to the New York Times edition of June 29th, 2006, 13 people were present, including Noel Forgeard and
Gustav Humbert. The delay in A380 deliveries was likely to cost EADS €2 billion over the following four years.
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collected. On February 14th, 2008 UBS saw its shares fall to a four-year low after it produced
the worst quarterly loss in the bank's history and revealed new details of its full exposure to the
Subprime crisis. Its stock fell more than 8% in Zurich and New York as executives failed to rule out
further writedowns|which already totaled $18.1 billion|or give a date for a return to protability.
The fall accelerated after U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman, Ben Bernanke, said investment banks
would have further writedowns. UBS conrmed that it lost CHF 12.5 billion in the nal quarter
of 2007, with full-year losses of CHF 4.4 billion|the rst in the decade since it merged with the
Swiss Bank Corporation|and had written o $13.7 billion in the nal quarter of the preceding
year. Our method detected 3 transactions in put options on January 30th, and February 11th and
12th, 2008. All options had short-term maturities and generated high returns after the stock crash
on February 14. Estimated gains amounted to nearly CHF 7 million. With respect to call options,
we identied 3 trades falling into the period 2007{2009, whose gains amounted to more than CHF
10 million.
4.3 Terrorist Attacks of September 11th: Options Traded in CBOE
The terrorist attacks have generated many articles, in which political, strategic and economic as-
pects have been considered. The nancial dimension has also been discussed by the press. In
particular, the question of whether the terrorist attacks of September 11th had been preceded by
abnormal trading volumes, generated widespread news reports just after 9/11. As far as ocial
regulators and control committees have been concerned, they dismiss charges against possible in-
formed traders. The American 9/11 Commission has stated that \exhaustive investigations by
the Security and Exchange Commission, FBI and other agencies have uncovered no evidence that
anyone with advance knowledge of the attacks proted through securities transactions."3
From an academic point of view, this topic did not generate much research interest. The arti-
cle of Poteshman (2006) is a notable exception. Focused mainly on the airline sector, Poteshman
computes the distributions of option market volume statistics both unconditionally and when con-
ditioning on the overall level of option activity, the return and trading volume on the underlying
stocks and the return on the overall market. He nds that \when the options market activity in
the days leading up to the terrorist attacks is compared to the benchmark distributions, volume
ratio statistics are seen to be at typical levels. As an indicator of long put volume, however, the
volume ratio statistics appear to be unusually high which is consistent with informed investors hav-
3The 9/11 Commission Report, Page 172, available on http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf.
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ing traded in the options market in advance of the attack." In the following the abnormal option
trades detected by our ex-post method are discussed in detail. We expect that corporate insiders
of the involved companies were unaware of the pending terrorist attacks, and therefore the joint
hypothesis does not apply in this case.
In total 13 transactions satisfy our criteria of abnormal trade and involve ve airlines companies
(AMR, UAL, BA and to a lesser extent DAL and KLM) and four banks (BAC, C, JPM and MER).
Concerning the airline sector, AMR and UAL are the two companies whose planes were hijacked and
crashed by the terrorists. Abnormal option trade for KLM may be surprising, but would support
the suspicion of \insider trading in KLM shares before September 11th attacks", as reported in a
Dutch government investigation (Associated Press Worldstream). The terrorist attacks had indirect
implications for BA and DAL, like a potential decrease in the number of passengers. Based on our
methodology, AMR, UAL, and BA were more likely object of abnormal trade than DAL and KLM.
With respect to the banking sector, Merrill Lynch, Bank of America, and J.P. Morgan were located
in World Trade Center or nearby, and the Travelers Insurance Unit of Citigroup was expected to
pay $500 million in claims.
In the case of American Airlines we will now report the details of the transaction which took
place on September 10th. Additional tables are available from the authors upon request. The
upper graphs in Figure 8 show the plot of option volume, Vt, versus its increment in open interest,
Xt. The abnormal trades are highlighted with the circles. The left graph covers the period from
January 1997 to December 2001, to better visualize the option market condition up to December
2001. The right graph covers the period January 1997{January 2006. The selected transactions
are isolated from the bulk of the data, suggesting that they are statistically unusual.
For September 2001 Figure 9 shows the dynamic of three variables: open interest, volume and
the option return. As claimed in several newspaper articles, the volume and open interest of puts
had been unusually high in the days leading up to September 11th. On September 10th 1,535 put
contracts were traded and from September 7th to September 10th the open interest increased of
1,312 contracts (at 99.5% quantile of its two-year empirical distribution). The trading volume was
more than 60 times the average of the total daily traded volume during the three weeks before
September 10th. These puts had a strike price of $30 and a maturity in October. On September
10th, the stock price was $29.7 and the put price was $2.15. On September 17th, when markets
reopened after the attacks, the stock price was $18 and the put price was $12. Such an investment
in put options generated an unusually high return (458% in one week). Put options were obviously
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exercised on September 17th, the open interest decreased of 597 contracts, generating a gain of
almost $600,000. A few days later, another considerable number of put options (475 contracts)
were exercised: Table 20 reports the gains (Gt) of such a trade. Twenty-six days later the sum
of exercised options corresponded to the increment observed on September 10th and lead to a
cumulative gain of more than one million (Gt = $1,179,171).
The lower graph in Figure 8 shows the cumulative gain for all transactions selected by our
procedure. The trade in put options of AMR corresponds to the transaction that leads to the
highest gains in the shortest time interval in the period we are considering. Trading volume after
September 17th was negligible meaning that the main gain was realized through exercise and not
selling the options. Similar conclusions can be reached for the other trades selected using our
procedure. For example two trading days before the terrorist attacks 4,179 put options (at 98.5%
quantile of its two-year empirical distribution) on Boeing were issued. The underlying stock was
traded at $45.18 and the option had a strike of $50. On September 17th, the stock was traded at
$35.8. Six days afterwards these options were exercised leading to gains of more than $5 million.
Concerning Bank of America, a large increment of 3,380 in open interest (at 96.3% quantile of its
two-year empirical distribution) took place on September 7th for an option with a strike of $60 when
the underlying asset had a value of $58.59 (on September 17th, the underlying stock had a value of
$54.35). The exercise of those options in the following seven days resulted in net gains of almost $2
million; for Merrill Lynch, on September 10th, 5,615 put options (at 99.1% quantile of its two-year
empirical distribution) with strike $50 were issued, the underlying stock had a value of $46.85. On
September 17th the underlying stock was traded at $41.48. Less than six days later these options
had been exercised leading to gains of around $4.5 million. For the remaining companies similar
results can be reached from the reported tables. Tables 20 and 22 show that the total gains in
the airline sector amount to more than $16 million, whereas in the banking sector $11 million in
gains have been computed. Interestingly, in nearly all cases the hypothesis of non-hedging cannot
rejected.4
4In the article \Not much stock in put conspiracy: the attacks on New York City and Washington have led to a
new urban legend, namely that inside traders used put options on airline stocks to line terrorist pockets" published on
June 3th, 2002 by Kelly Patricia O'Meara in Insight on the News, other repeated spikes of volumes of put options on
American Airlines and United Airlines during the year before 9/11 are highlighted and used as argument that what
occurred in the days leading up to 9/11 was not as unusual as other theories claim. Both our methods do not select
those option trades mainly because those spikes in volume do not correspond to large increments in open interest.
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4.4 Terrorist Attacks of September 11th: Options Traded in EUREX
Several reinsurance companies suered severe losses from the terrorist attacks of September 11th.
Liabilities for Munich Re and Swiss Re|the world's two largest reinsurers|were estimated to be in
the amount of billions of dollars a few days after the attacks. At the same time, several newspapers
reported that trading in shares of these two companies were at unusual levels in the days leading
up to September 11th, divulging some rumors of abnormal trading activities. A detailed analysis
of transactions on the options market has however thus far been ignored. Options with underlying
Swiss Re and Munich Re are mainly traded on the EUREX, one of the world's largest derivatives
exchanges and the leading clearing house in Europe established in 1998 after the merger of Deutsche
Terminborse (DTB, the German derivatives exchange) and SOFFEX (Swiss Options and Financial
Futures). In this section we use the EUREX database provided by Deutsche Bank to analyze
transactions in put options with underlying Swiss Re and Munich Re. The database does not
contain intraday data and hence the hedging dimension cannot be investigated.
In the case of Munich Re, 4 abnormal trades are detected between 1999 and 2008 which belong
to the set 
1\
3\
4, one of which took place on August 30th, 2001. As we are mainly interested
in abnormal trades surrounding the terrorist attacks in this subsection, we only discuss the details
of this transaction (the others took place on August 29th, 2002; September 2nd, 2002; and October
19th, 2007). The detected put option with underlying Munich Re matured at the end of September,
2001 and had a strike of €320 (the underlying asset was traded at €300.86 on August 30th). That
option shows a large increment in open interest of 996 contracts (at 92.2% quantile of its two-
year empirical distribution) on August 30th. Its price on that day was €10.22 and the ex-ante
probability qt is slightly lower than 5%. On the day of the terrorist attacks, the underlying stock
lost more than 15% (the closing price on September 10th was €261.88 and on September 11th
€220.53) and the option price jumped to €89.56, corresponding to a return of 776% in 8 trading
days. On September 12th, 1,350 put options with those characteristics were exercised. The gains
Gt related to the exercise of the 996 put options issued on August 30th correspond to more than
€3.4 million.
In the case of Swiss Re, 6 abnormal trades are detected between 1999 and 2008 which belong
to the set 
1 \ 
3 \ 
4, one of which took place a few weeks before the terrorist attacks, on
August 20th. This option expired at the end of September, 2001, had a strike of €159.70 and had
a large increment in open interest of 3,302 contracts (at 99.8% quantile of its two-year empirical
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distribution) on August 20th. That option was traded at €0.8 and exhibits an ex-ante probability
qt of 0.4%, meaning that such an event happens on average once a year. The Swiss Re closing share
price was €177.56 on August 20th. On September 11th, when the stock price fell from €152.62 to
€126.18, the option generated a return of 4,050% in three trading weeks, when its price jumped
to €33.2. Through the exercise of these put options in the 9 days following the attacks, the total
gains were more than €8 million. Together with Munich Re, a total gain of €11.4 million had
been realized in less than two trading weeks by using two options with underlying Munich Re and
Swiss Re. To save space the corresponding tables and gures are omitted but are available from
the authors upon request.
5 Accuracy of the Hedging Detection Method
In this appendix we provide an assessment of the accuracy of our hedging detection method used in
the main paper. Recall that the hypothesis H0 of no hedging when abnormal trades occur at day i
is rejected whenever V buyi > q
V buy,non-hedgei
 , implying that a sizable component of buyer-initiated
trades in the stock is due to hedging. We measure the accuracy of the method by computing
the probability of rejecting H0 when the latter does not hold, namely the power of the test. Let
V buyi = (1 + hi) V
buy,non-hedge
i , where hi  0. The hi represents the ratio between buyer-initiated
volume due to hedging and buyer-initiated volume due to non-hedging. By construction H0 is
equivalent to hi = 0 meaning that volume trades due to hedging is zero. The hypothesis H0 should
be rejected when hi > 0, and the higher the rejection rate the more accurate the hedging detection
method. Let q := q
V buy,non-hedgei
 , the measure of accuracy A(hi) reads
A(hi) := P
h
V buyi > qjhi
i
= P
h
V buy,non-hedgei > q=(1 + hi)jhi
i
: (1)
The hedging detection method is accurate whenever A(hi) increases fast enough in hi. The proba-
bility in (1) can be calculated as (1  ~F (q=(1 + hi)jXi)), where ~F is estimated using the adjusted
Nadaraya{Watson estimator as in the main paper and  = 0:95 as in our empirical analysis. We
computed A(hi) for several stocks, sample periods, estimation windows, and dierent values of
hi and of the conditioning variables Xi = (jrij; V buy,non-hedgei 1 ). Table 26 gives numerical values
of A(hi) for Citigroup on the randomly chosen day December 17th, 2001. Corresponding results
for other stocks and days are fairly similar and available upon request from the authors. When
hi = 0, A(hi) is very close to 0:05 = (1  ), which is the non-eliminable size of the test. When hi
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increases, A(hi) increases as well although certain combinations of the conditioning variables are
more favorable than others to reject the hypothesis of no hedging. Overall the power of the test is
fairly satisfactory. For example when hi = 0:20, A(hi) can be as high as 20%.
6 Conclusion
This supplemental appendix extends the empirical results in the main paper and analyzes call and
put options trades on several nancial institutions from January 1996 to September 2009, covering
the Subprime nancial crisis. We nd that the detected option trades are not uniformly distributed
over our sample period (1996{2009), but that the great majority falls into the period 2007{2009.
Our empirical ndings suggest that periods leading up to certain events such as the takeovers of
AIG, Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac, the collapse of Bear Stearns Corporation and public announcements
relating to large losses/writedowns are preceded by abnormal trading activities in options. Realized
gains amount to several hundreds of millions of dollars.
References
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Content of Tables: day on which the transaction took place, Day; market condition at day
t measured by the average return of the underlying stock during the last two trading weeks, Mt;
option strike K; option price, Pt; stock value, St; its time-to-maturity,  ; increment in open interest
from day t  1 to day t, OIt; its quantile with respect to its empirical distribution computed over
the last two years, qt; corresponding volume, Vt; maximum for calls and minimum for puts return
realized by the underlying stock during the two-week period following the transaction day, rst ;
number of days between transaction day t and when this maximum return occurs, 1; maximum
return realized by the selected option during the two-week period following the transaction day,
rot ; number of days between transaction day t and when this maximum return occurs, 2; gains
realized through the exercise of the new option issued at time t, Gt; short description of the event
and why the stock drops, Event's description. Number in bracket after Put options or Call options
denotes the number of detected option abnormal trades for our whole sample period, January 1996
{ September 2009.
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Accuracy of the hedging detection method for Citigroup on 17 Dec 2001
hi
0 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50
Percentiles
20 20 0.051 0.052 0.077 0.089 0.094 0.124 0.151 0.193 0.227 0.277 0.306
20 40 0.046 0.058 0.079 0.106 0.116 0.174 0.196 0.235 0.287 0.290 0.299
20 60 0.051 0.063 0.070 0.100 0.131 0.156 0.157 0.210 0.210 0.265 0.282
20 80 0.069 0.072 0.072 0.075 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.077 0.095 0.125 0.180
40 20 0.055 0.057 0.064 0.087 0.117 0.124 0.168 0.185 0.198 0.207 0.223
40 40 0.053 0.055 0.090 0.096 0.147 0.158 0.167 0.182 0.219 0.239 0.272
40 60 0.056 0.064 0.081 0.120 0.125 0.159 0.183 0.218 0.253 0.284 0.298
40 80 0.041 0.104 0.188 0.190 0.201 0.231 0.254 0.265 0.282 0.291 0.306
60 20 0.051 0.052 0.059 0.078 0.098 0.102 0.161 0.180 0.198 0.200 0.217
60 40 0.049 0.066 0.070 0.098 0.119 0.125 0.136 0.161 0.161 0.249 0.253
60 60 0.051 0.051 0.062 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.097 0.114 0.125 0.126 0.138
60 80 0.050 0.055 0.074 0.075 0.099 0.114 0.151 0.153 0.157 0.192 0.208
80 20 0.049 0.088 0.131 0.147 0.153 0.156 0.166 0.178 0.189 0.195 0.210
80 40 0.049 0.056 0.063 0.075 0.116 0.136 0.158 0.179 0.183 0.192 0.195
80 60 0.049 0.071 0.085 0.085 0.092 0.100 0.110 0.136 0.150 0.183 0.183
80 80 0.033 0.070 0.070 0.080 0.084 0.099 0.099 0.099 0.151 0.154 0.231
Table 26: Entries are the probabilities of rejecting the hypothesis H0 of no hedging when abnormal
trades occur for the Citigroup stock on day i = December 17th, 2001, i.e., A(hi) in (1), for various
levels of hi and Xi. hi is the ratio between volume due to hedging and volume due to non-
hedging. Xi = (jrij; V buy,non-hedgei 1 ) are the conditioning variables, i.e., stock return on day i and
buyer-initiated volume due to non-hedging on day i   1, respectively. Percentiles are the levels
of percentiles for the distributions of jrij and V buy,non-hedgei 1 , respectively, used as values of the
conditioning variables in adjusted Nadaraya{Watson estimator as in the main paper.
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Figure 1: Selected put option with underlying stock AIG before the Federal Reserve Board an-
nounced that it would take a nearly 80% equity stake in AIG|eectively taking over the rm|and
would provide an $85 billion loan on September 15th, 2008. The solid line shows the daily dynamic
of open interest, the bar the corresponding trading volume (left y-axis) and the dash-dot line, the
option return (right y-axis). The empty circle is the day of the transaction, the lled circle is the
announcement day, September 15th, 2008. This put option had a strike of $8 and matured at the
end of October 2008.
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Figure 2: Selected put option with underlying stock AIG before the Federal Reserve Board an-
nounced that it would take a nearly 80% equity stake in AIG|eectively taking over the rm|and
would provide an $85 billion loan on September 15th, 2008. The solid line shows the daily dynamic
of open interest, the bar the corresponding trading volume (left y-axis) and the dash-dot line, the
option return (right y-axis). The empty circle is the day of the transaction, the lled circle is the
announcement day, September 15th, 2008. This put option had a strike of $10 and matured at the
end of September 2008.
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Figure 3: Selected call option with underlying stock AIG before the August 7th, 2009 quarterly
prot announcement that almost doubled the stock value. The solid line shows the daily dynamic
of open interest, the bar the corresponding trading volume (left y-axis) and the dash-dot line, the
option return (right y-axis). The empty circle is the day of the transaction, the lled circle is the
announcement day, August 7th, 2009. This call option had a strike of $15 and matured at the end
of September 2009.
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Figure 4: Selected put option with underlying stock Fannie Mae before the federal takeover on
September 5th, 2008. The abnormal option trade takes place on August 28th, 2008. The solid line
shows the daily dynamic of open interest, the bar the corresponding trading volume (left y-axis) and
the dash-dot line the option return (right y-axis). The empty circle is the day of the transaction,
August 28th, 2008, and the lled circle is Monday, September 8, when the stock price of Fannie
Mae crashed by almost 90% to under $1. This put option had a strike of $7 and a time-to-maturity
of more than 100 days.
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Figure 5: Selected put option with underlying stock Fannie Mae before the federal takeover on
September 5th, 2008. The abnormal option trade takes place on August 29th, 2008. The solid line
shows the daily dynamic of open interest, the bar the corresponding trading volume (left y-axis) and
the dash-dot line the option return (right y-axis). The empty circle is the day of the transaction,
August 29th, 2008, and the lled circle is Monday, September 8th, when the stock price of Fannie
Mae crashed by almost 90% to under $1. This put option had a strike of $3 and a maturity at the
end of October 2008.
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Figure 6: Selected put option with underlying stock Bear Stearns before the company collapse on
March 17th, 2008. The abnormal option trade takes place on March 10th, 2008. The solid line
shows the daily dynamic of open interest, the bar the corresponding trading volume (left y-axis) and
the dash-dot line, the option return (right y-axis). The empty circle is the day of the transaction,
the lled circle is Monday, March 17th, the day Bear Stearns shares dropped nearly 90% to $2.86.
This put option had a strike of $30 and matured at the end of March 2008.
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Figure 8: Upper graphs show on the x-axis maximal daily increment in open interest across all put
options with underlying American Airlines (AMR), and on the y-axis the corresponding trading
volume. Upper-left graph covers the period January 1997 { December 2001, upper-right graphs the
period January 1997 { January 2006. Lower graph shows cumulative gains Gt in USD for detected
option abnormal trade on AMR. Gains correspond to those realized by daily exercising/selling the
options.
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Figure 9: Selected put option for abnormal trading with underlying stock American Airlines (AMR)
before the United Airlines (UAL) announcement of $4.3 billion acquisition of US Airways in May
2000. The solid line shows the daily dynamic of open interest, the bars show the corresponding
trading volume (left y-axis) and the dash-dot line the option return (right y-axis). The empty circle
is the day of the transaction, the lled circle is the day of the announcement (partially covered by
the highest bar). This put option had a strike of $35 and matured at the end of June 2000.
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